Using a CGE Model to Identify the Policy Trade-Off between Unemployment and Inflation: The Efficient Phillips Curve by André García, Francisco Javier et al.
0.
8
CE
:S
V
QA
:
Co
ll:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
Techset Composition Ltd, Salisbury CESR691088.TeX Page#: 20 Printed: 15/5/2012
Economic Systems Research, 2012, Vol. 00(0), Month, pp. 1–20
USINGA CGE MODEL TO IDENTIFY THE POLICY
TRADE-OFF BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENTAND
INFLATION. THE EFFICIENT PHILLIPS CURVE
M. CARMEN LIMAa*, FRANCISCO J. ANDRÉb and M. ALEJANDRO
CARDENETEa,c
aDepartment of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Seville, Spain; bDepartment of
Economic Analysis, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain; cEuropean Commission
(IPTS-JRC), Seville, Spain
(Received 6 July 2011; In ﬁnal form 2 May 2012)
This paper provides a new reading of a classical economic relation: the short-run Phillips curve. Our point is
that, when dealing with inﬂation and unemployment, policy-making can be understood as a multicriteria decision-
making problem. Hence, we use so-called multiobjective programming in connection with a computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model to determine the combinations of policy instruments that provide efﬁcient combinations
of inﬂation and unemployment. This approach results in an alternative version of the Phillips curve labelled as
efﬁcient Phillips curve. Our aim is to present an application of CGE models to a new area of research that can be
especially useful when addressing policy exercises with real data. We apply our methodological proposal within a
particular regional economy, Andalusia, in the south of Spain. This tool can give some keys for policy advice and
policy implementation in the ﬁght against unemployment and inﬂation.
Keywords: Short-run Phillips curve; Multicriteria decision-making; Computable general equilibrium model;
Efﬁcient policies; Multiobjective programming
1. INTRODUCTION
The Phillips curve (Phillips, 1958) is a well-known hypothesis reporting a historical inverse
relationship between the rate of unemployment and the rate of inﬂation. In simple terms,
the lower the unemployment in an economy, the higher the rate of inﬂation. Through the
Q2
decades, the Phillips curve has been the origin of many developments and controversies
on the basis of the theory, its differential short- and long-run behaviours and its utility for
political economy purposes.
In the 1960s, the Phillips curve was someway interpreted as a “policy menu” in the
sense that, by applying Keynesian (expansive or contractive) policies, the governments
might choose among different combinations of inﬂation and unemployment (Samuelson and
Solow, 1960). In this paper, we provide an approach to the Phillips curve fully oriented to
policy-making, by empirically identifying an efﬁcient short-run trade-off between inﬂation
and unemployment and studying how macroeconomic policy can be tailored to deal with
inﬂation and unemployment.
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This work is inspired in a methodological approach in which policy-making is seen as
a multicriteria decision-making (MCMD) problem (André et al., 2010; Sancho, 2011).1
The general idea is that macroeconomic policy-making tends to pursue macroeconomic
objectives that conﬂict with each other. This point is rather consistent with the original idea
of the Phillips curve: in the short-run, a very active anti-unemployment policy will typically
foster inﬂation and the other way around. In order to deal with this policy conﬂict, our
proposal is to build a set of policy options that consist in different policy mixes giving rise
to different unemployment–inﬂation combinations, what can be seen as something similar
to a policymenu. Thus, we envision the (short-run) unemployment–inﬂation trade-off noted
by Phillips as a bicriteria policy problem in which the government acts as a decision-maker,
the decision variables are the policy instruments that the government has at hand and the
objectives are unemployment and inﬂation. The policy-maker can design its policy to decide
between a lower rate of inﬂation (typically at the cost of a high rate of unemployment), a
lower rate of unemployment (possibly with a high rate of inﬂation) or an intermediate
situation.
To put this idea into practice, we need a structural model of the economy that endoge-
nously gives different combinations of inﬂation and unemployment as the result of different
combinations of policy instruments. For this purpose, we use a computable general equi-
librium (CGE) model. Moreover, since there is a virtually inﬁnite number of policy mixes,
we need a sensible criterion to determine which of them should be taken into account.
Following André and Cardenete (2009a; 2009b), we focus on so-called efﬁcient policies,
i.e. those policy mixes that are not Pareto-dominated from the point of view of the relevant
policy objectives. To illustrate the potential of our approach, we develop an exercise with
real data from Andalusia, a region in the south of Spain characterized by a high rate of
unemployment and important labour market rigidities that have traditionally compromised
its economic growth.
The main novelties of our approach in comparison with the traditional Phillips curve
are the following: ﬁrst, when compared to some theoretical macroeconomic models which
include the Phillips curve as an assumption in the formof an additional equation of themodel
(see, for example, Boscá et al., 2010), in our case, the Phillips curve is not imposed as an
assumption, but endogenously obtained from the model as an empirical equilibrium result.
Moreover, the relationship derived here is an “ex-post” relation in the sense that it takes into
account general equilibrium effects and, therefore, all direct and indirect macroeconomic
effects on unemployment and inﬂation that result from the adjustment of the economy
towards a new equilibrium after any new policy has been implemented. Second, in contrast
to the classical approach in the empirical literature, we do not mix data from different years,
but we restrict ourselves to a given economy in the same period of time. Therefore, along
the curve that we obtain, the underlying fundamentals of the economy can be considered
as constant and the only thing that changes from one point of the curve to another is the
implemented combination of policy instruments. The interesting implication of this feature
is that this curve can be more properly interpreted as a real policy trade-off. Third, and
perhaps more notably, the unemployment–inﬂation curve that we obtain can be seen as an
efﬁcient (short-run) Phillips-like curve in the sense that all the points in this curve have
1 See Ballestero and Romero (1998) for an introduction to multicriteria techniques and their applications to
economic problems or Figueira et al. (2004) for a state-of-the-art review.
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
THE POLICY TRADE-OFF BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION 3
the property that they are not Pareto-dominated. So, our Phillips-like curve is a kind of
Q1
policy menu built under the assumption that the government aims at combining its policy
instruments in an efﬁcient way. Finally, from a purely methodological point of view, there
is a contribution with respect to the previous literature in the fact of combining a structural
descriptive (CGE) model of the economy with a programming tool for policy simulation.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure: in Section 2, we present a brief
overview of the related literature. In Section 3, we outline themain features of our approach,
including the CGE model used all over the paper, the database used to calibrate the model
and the basic elements of our policy design exercise. In Section 4, we display the main
results of our calculations in which we obtain an efﬁcient Phillips curve for the Andalusian
conomy. In Section 5, we suggest that our policy-oriented interpretation of the Phillips curve
can be seen as a particular case of a broader approach in which policy design is a decision
problem with multiple conﬂicting objectives. We show that the observed policy could have
been improved in several directions with respect to the observed situation (by improving
one or more objectives without worsening any of the other). Section 6 summarizes the main
ﬁndings of the paper.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968), under convergent approaches, were two of the ﬁrst
authors that revisited the initial concept of the Phillips curve introduced by Phillips (1958).
Friedman argued that the Phillips relation only holds in the short-run and both authors
claimed that in the long-run, employers and workers would pay attention only to real wages
and the unemployment rate would then stand at a constant level called the “natural rate” of
unemployment or non-accelerating inﬂation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). In the long-
run, only the NAIRU would be consistent with a stable inﬂation rate. The inclusion of this
“natural rate” as well as a simple pattern of adaptative expectations (Cagan, 1956; Nerlove,
1958) in the inﬂation–unemployment relationship, was known as the “expectations aug-
mented Phillips curve”. Under this framework, Friedman made a clear distinction between
short-run and long-run Phillips curve. In the short-run, the curve slopes down but a com-
pletely inelastic curve would remain in the long-run. The stagﬂation registered during the
second half of the 1960s and the 1970s raised new insights in economic thought and the
discussion was taken up again: the rational expectations hypothesis from the new classical
economists planted the seed of doubts of the curve even in the short-run, but again the
new Keynesians went back to the idea of a short-run Phillips curve, marked by rigidities in
nominal and real prices and wages.
Recently, a new generation of monetary general equilibrium models, called the (new
Keynesian) dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models has made some contri-
butions to the explanation of the links betweenmoney, output and inﬂation over the business
cycle.2 In traditional DSGEmodels, unemployment is ruled out by assumption (all variation
in labour input occurs along the intensive hours margin), and inﬂation is mainly driven by
the workers’marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. But in contrast
to this theoretical viewpoint, the empirical evidence suggests that in periods of low output,
2 More information about new Keynesian DSGE models can be found in Galí (2008).
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4 M.C. LIMA et al.
employed workers work less hours, but also fewer workers are employed; and the other way
round. This is the reason why several authors have incorporated a theory of unemployment
into the new Keynesian theory, giving rise to the so-called new Keynesian Phillips curve.
That is the case of Blanchard and Galí (2008), Clarida et al. (1999) or Trigari (2009) among
others. In a similar fashion, Walsh (2003; 2005) outlines “the importance of combining a
labour market structure based on a Mortensen–Pissarides (1994) aggregate matching func-
tion with an optimising model of price rigidity”, arguing that the real side of the economy
must be taken into account.
Many authors have attempted to incorporate the extensivemargin and unemployment into
new Keynesian models (see, for example, Krause and Lubik, 2007; Ravenna and Walsh,
2008). Most of these authors study how the elasticity of inﬂation with respect to unem-
ployment depends on structural characteristics of the labour market and they directly focus
on the implications of the labour market speciﬁcation for the Phillips curve. According
to Ravenna and Walsh (2008), “the search-friction Phillips curve can potentially reconcile
the new Keynesian model of inﬂation with the data” (p. 1495). In a recent paper, Galí
et al. (2011) propose a reformulation of the Smets and Wouters (2007) framework in which
the unemployment rate is modelled as an additional observable variable. This way, they
develop an approach that tries to overcome the labour market limitations of the new Key-
nesian papers to measure the output gap. Some other relevant contributions in the ﬁeld are
due to Shimer in the last decade. In Shimer (2005), for example, this author remarks that
when an economy experiences a shock, the search and matching model cannot produce the
observed business-cycle-frequency ﬂuctuations in variables such as unemployment and job
vacancies.
Summing up, although nowadays there is not a unanimous position among economists,
there seems to be a certain degree of consensus on the idea that, in the long-run, price stabil-
ity is more likely to support higher investment and employment, giving rise to an inexistent
or even positive, rather than negative relation between inﬂation and unemployment. Never-
theless, in the short-run, many arguments have been offered to support the idea that inﬂation
and unemployment can be inversely related.Actually, the relationship between both of these
variables will depend on the speciﬁc structure of the economy and, therefore, the analysis of
the Phillips curve (either if it exists or not and its speciﬁc shape) is essentially an empirical
issue and remains inﬂuential nowadays.3
Phillips himself never presented the curve as a policy menu, but he was clearly aware that
it could be interpreted in this way, andmight be treated as such by governments. That is why,
when considering the implications of hiswork for the internationalmonetary system towards
the end of his inaugural lecture in 1962, he suggested that a “limited degree of exchange rate
ﬂexibility would allow each country time to ﬁnd by trial and error that compromise between
its internal objectives which was consistent with its exchange rate policy” (cited in Laidler,
2001). This interpretation of the curve as a policy menu has been extensively discused in
the literature based on the grounds that the “natural rate” of unemployment might be very
difﬁcult to determine and that the curve is not likely to remain in one position (see Laidler,
1997 for a discussion).
3 For further discussion and new insights about the Phillips curve, see Usabiaga and Gómez (1996), Galí and
Gertler (1999), Gordon (2009) and Karanassou et al. (2010).
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THE POLICY TRADE-OFF BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION 5
3. METHODOLOGYAND DATA
Our approach consists in determining the trade-off between inﬂation and unemployment by
constructing and calibrating a structuralmodel of the economy and using thatmodel to check
the pairs of inﬂation and unemployment resulting from different policy mixes. We develop
a CGE model and we calibrate it with data from the Spanish region of Andalusia. Then, we
simulate different policy combinations and evaluate the resulting values of unemployment
and inﬂation.
3.1. The Economic Model
We use a CGE model in the walrasian tradition as in Scarf and Shoven (1984) or Shoven
and Whalley (1992). This kind of model has been widely used for policy analysis. See,
for example, Hagger and Madden (2003), Naastepad (2003), Savard (2005) orYao and Liu
(2000) for some recent applications and Kehoe et al. (2005) for the state of the art. Follow-
ing the CGE tradition, this model performs a structural disaggregate representation of the
economic activity as well as the equilibrium of markets, according to basic microeconomic
principles.
In our model, taxes and the activity of the public sector are taken as exogenous by
consumers and ﬁrms, while they are considered as decision variables by the government.
Assuming that consumers maximize their utility and ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts (net of
taxes), the model provides an equilibrium solution; that is, a price vector for all goods and
inputs, a vector of activity levels and a value for public income. In equilibrium, all markets
clear and public income equals total payments from all economic agents. To save some
space, we only present some basic features of the model. A more detailed description of the
model can be found in André et al. (2005).
The model comprises 25 productive sectors (Table 1) with one representative ﬁrm in
each sector, a single representative consumer, one public sector and one foreign sector
(representing the commercial relationships between Andalusia and the rest of the world,
including the rest of Spain and any other countries).4
The production technology is described by a nested production function: the domestic
output of sector j, denoted by Xdj, is obtained by combining, through a Leontief technology,
outputs from the rest of sectors and value added, VAj. This value added is generated from
primary inputs (labour,L, and capital,K), combinedby aCobb–Douglas technology.Overall
output of sector j, Qj, is obtained from a Cobb–Douglas combination of domestic output
and imports Xrowj, according to the Armington (1969) hypothesis, in which domestic and
imported products are taken as imperfect substitutes.
There are 25 different goods – corresponding to the number of productive sectors. The
representative consumer demands present consumption goods and saves the remainder of
his disposable income after paying taxes. The government raises taxes to obtain public
revenue, R – direct, indirect and payroll taxes – as well as it provides transfers to the private
4 Since we focus on aggregate results, the exact number of sectors considered is not crucial. The level of disag-
gregation is an arbitrary decision of the researcher or the policy-maker: the more disaggregate is the model, the
more information one can manage in the analysis, but the computational burden is higher as well.
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TABLE 1. Productive sectors in SAM.
1. Agriculture 14. Vehicles
2. Cattle and forestry 15. Transport
3. Fishing 16. Food
4. Extractives 17. Manufacturing of textile and leather
5. Reﬁne 18. Manufacturing of wood
6. Electricity 19. Other manufactures
7. Gas 20. Construction
8. Water 21. Commerce
9. Minery 22. Transport and communications
10. Manufacturing of construction material 23. Other services
11. Chemicals 24. Sales services
12. Manufacturing of metal products 25. Non-sales services
13. Machinery
Source: Cardenete and Sancho (2003).
sector, TPS, and demands goods and services, GDj, from each sector j = 1, . . ., 25.5 PD
denotes the ﬁnal balance (surplus or deﬁcit) of the public budget (in nominal terms):
PD = R − TPS · cpi −
25∑
j=1
GDj · pj, (1)
cpi being the Consumer Price Index and pj a production price index before value added
tax (VAT hereafter) referring to all goods produced by sector j. The cpi is calculated as
a weighted average of the prices of all sectors, according to the share of each one in the
overall consumption of the economy. Both TPS and GDj (j = 1, . . ., 25) are real variables
and they are multiplied by the relevant price variable to get the nominal version. Hence, TPS
is measured in constant monetary units, whereas TPS · cpi is measured in current monetary
units. GDj is measured in goods, whereas GDj · pj is measured in (current) monetary units.
Similar transformations are done for other variables of the model.
Consumer disposable income (YD henceforth) is expressed in nominal terms and equals
labour and capital income, plus transfers, minus direct taxes:
YD = w · L + r · K + cpi · TPS + TROW − DT(r · K + cpi · TPS + TROW)
− DT(w · L − WC · w · L) − WC · w · L, (2)
where w and r denote input (labour and capital) prices, L and K denote input quantities
sold by the consumer, TROW represents transfers from the rest of the world, DT is the tax
rate of the income tax (IT hereafter) and WC the tax rate corresponding to the payment of
the employees to Social Security (ESS hereafter). The consumer’s objective is to maximize
5 In ourmodel, the payroll tax (Social Security paid by employers)works similar to other indirect taxes. Speciﬁcally,
it operates by taxing wages paid by employers to workers. The total revenue from this tax (denoted as RFSS) is
calculated as RFSS =∑25j=1 FCj · w · Lj , where FCj is the payroll tax rate paid by employers in sector i, w is the
wage and Lj is the sectoral labour factor endowment. On the other hand, the direct labour tax (Social Security paid
by employees) is calculated according to RWSS = WC · w · L, where RWSS is the revenue from this tax, WC is the
payroll tax rate paid by employees and L is the total labour factor endowment.
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THE POLICY TRADE-OFF BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION 7
his utility (welfare), subject to his budget constraint.Welfare is obtained from consumption
goods CDj (j = 1, . . ., 25) and savings SD – according to a Cobb–Douglas utility function
– that leads to the following optimization problem:6
maximize U(CD1, . . . , CD25, SD) =
⎛
⎝ 25∏
j=1
CDαjj
⎞
⎠SDβ
subject to
25∑
j=1
pjCDj + pinv SD = YD,
(3)
pinv being an investment price index. Saving, SD, is deﬁned as the amount of disposable
income that is not consumed.
Regarding investment and saving, this is a saving driven model. The closure rule is
deﬁned in such a way that investment is exogenous, saving is determined by the consumer’s
decisions and both variables are related with the public and foreign sectors by the following
identity, where INVj denotes investment in sector j and ROWD denotes the balance of the
foreign sector:
25∑
j=1
INVj · pinv = SD · pinv + PD + ROWD. (4)
Labour and capital demands are computed under the assumption that ﬁrms minimize the
cost of producing value added. Since we make a short-term analysis, in the capital market,
we consider that total supply is perfectly inelastic. For labour supply, we reconcile the
existence of unemployment with the equilibrium assumption by following the approach
used in Kehoe et al. (1995). Speciﬁcally, we assume that unions ﬁx the real salary taking
into account the current rate of unemployment according to the following equation:7
w
cpi
=
(
1 − u
1 − u
)1/β
, (5)
where u is the current unemployment rate (i.e. that rate resulting from the simulated policies)
and u is the benchmark unemployment rate (in our case, that rate observed in reality in
the economy under study, i.e. Andalusia 1995) and w/cpi is the real wage. Following
Oswald (1982), this equation is based on the assumption that ﬁrms determine labour demand
(and hence, total employment) and unions determine the real wage. Moreover, we assume
that labour is inelastically supplied, which, together with the endogenous labour demand
function allows us to determine equilibrium unemployment. As a result of this setting, if
6 Alternative (dynamic)modelling approaches represent saving as amechanism to allocate income intertemporally.
Problem (3) can be seen as a simpliﬁed (static) speciﬁcation in which saving is justiﬁed because it provides some
utility to the consumer. This utility can be rationalized as summarizing the ﬂow of utility that the consumer would
obtain from future consumption, thanks to saving.
7 One may think that Equation 5 can be seen as a wage Phillips curve. Nevertheless, note that Equation 5 shows
a connection between two real variables: real wages and unemployment, whereas in the Phillips curve, we look
for a connection between a real variable (unemployment) and a nominal variable (nominal wages in the case of
the wage Phillips curve or price inﬂation in our case). Since both w and p are free variables, Equation 5 does not
imply any speciﬁc relationship between unemployment and wage inﬂation or between unemployment and price
inﬂation.
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labour demand increases (decreases), the unemployment rate u decreases (increases) and
workers demand higher (lower) real wages. The rationale for this mechanism is that a lower
(higher) rate of unemployment endows unions with more (less) bargaining power. If, after
the simulation, employment remains unchanged, the real wage will be the same as in the
benchmark equilibrium.
On the other hand, β is a ﬂexibility parameter measuring the sensitivity of wages with
respect to unemployment. If β approaches zero, unemployment approaches its bench-
mark value, meaning that wages adjust perfectly to keep unemployment unchanged. As
β approaches inﬁnity, the real wage tends to 1, its benchmark value, meaning that (real)
wages are perfectly rigid and do not respond to changes in unemployment. For the empirical
exercises, we take an estimated value for Spain from the econometric literature: β = 1.25
(Andrés et al., 1990).
Real gross domestic product (GDP hereafter) is calculated from the expenditure point
of view, by aggregating the values of private consumption, investment, public expenditure
and net exports using constant prices.
3.2. Databases and Calibration
The main data used in this paper are those contained in the social accounting matrix (SAM
hereafter) for Andalusia 1995 (see Cardenete and Sancho, 2003, for technical details). The
SAM comprises 40 accounts, including 25 productive sectors (Table 1), 2 inputs (labour and
capital), a saving/investment account, a government account, direct taxes (IT and ESS) and
indirect taxes (VAT, payroll tax, output tax and tariffs), a foreign sector and a representative
consumer.
Regarding the sectoral composition of the Andalusian economy, from our database, we
conclude that the four most important sectors in terms of their share in total output are
Commerce (21), that represents a 15.8% of total output, Other services (23) with 13.3%,
Food (16) with 9.8% and Construction (20) with 9.4%. These sectors, altogether, represent
a 48.3% of total regional output. An additional insight from the sectoral point of view is the
large importance of services inAndalusia (includingCommerce (21) andOther services (23)
again, as well as Transport and Communications (22), Sales services (24) and Non-sales
services (25)) that represent a 44.3% share of total production.
The numerical values for the parameters in the model are obtained by the usual procedure
of calibration (see, for example, Mansur and Whalley, 1984). The following parameters are
calibrated: all the technical coefﬁcients of the production functions, all the tax rates and
the coefﬁcients of the utility function. The calibration criterion is to reproduce the 1995
SAM as an initial equilibrium that is used as a benchmark for all the simulations. In such
a benchmark, all the prices and the activity levels are set equal to 1, so that, after any of
the simulation exercises, it is immediate to observe the change rate of relative prices and
activity levels in the resulting equilibrium.
As it is common in GGE models, we need to choose a price as the numeraire (which
will be held as constant and equal to 1 during all the analysis) because these models are
formulated in terms of relative rather than absolute prices. The rest of prices in the model
are allowed to vary as required to meet equilibrium conditions and those variations should
be interpreted in terms of the numeraire. In other words, if the model gives as a result that
a price increases by, say, y percent, we should interpret that this price increases y percent
more than the numeraire. In most CGE applications, only relative prices matter and then the
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selection of the numeraire is rather arbitrary. But in our application, since we are interested
in having a credible measure of inﬂation, it is particularly relevant to choose an adequate
numeraire.
The idea is to choose one price that, as far as possible, can be argued to be realistically
robust to internal policy changes in practice. We have decided that the best candidate was
the price of capital, r. The reason is that this price is mainly determined by the interest rate,
and being Spain a small open economy, the interest rate in practice is, to a large extent,
exogenously determined by the international ﬁnancial markets. Nowadays, since Spain is
a member of the European Monetary Union, its interest rate is essentially determined by
the European monetary policy. The idea is to have a numeraire that is expected not to
change under different policy changes so that we can meaningfully interpret the variations
of the prices obtained from the model (which are, by construction, relative variations) as a
reasonable approximation to the absolute variations of those prices in practice.
3.3. Policy Setting
Once the model is built and calibrated, our aim is to simulate the effects of different pol-
icy combinations and compute the resulting values of inﬂation and unemployment. Our
methodological approach could, in principle, be applied to any kind of policy mix, but we
decided to focus just on ﬁscal policy because this is the type of policy that our CGE is more
adequate to deal with.We envision policy design as a bi-criteria decision problem where the
decision-maker is the government, the objective variables are inﬂation and unemployment
and the decision variables are public expenditure and taxes.
Concerning the policy objectives, the rate of unemployment (u) is obtained as the result
of the job market equations (Equation 5), whereas the inﬂation rate (π ) is calculated as the
annual rate of change of the cpi:
π = cpi1995 − cpi1994
cpi1994
× 100, (6)
where the subscript refers to years. The value of cpi for 1994 is exogenously given and the
value for 1995 is endogenously determined, as an equilibrium result.8
Denote as x the vector of policy instruments, including public expenditure in goods and
services of each activity sector (GDj, i = 1, . . ., 25) and the average tax rates applied to every
economic sector, including indirect taxes – Social Security contributions paid by employers
(ECj) and VATj – as well as direct taxes: Social Security contributions paid by employees
(Wj) and IT (TD). Concerning the feasible set for these policy variables, we impose the
following constraints to increase the realism of the exercise:
(a) We take as a benchmark the values of public expenditure and tax rates observed in the
SAM and obtained in the calibration procedure. We restrict all the policy variables to
vary less than 5% with respect to their values in the benchmark situation (denoted as
x0), i.e.
0.95 x0 ≤ x ≤ 1.05 x0. (7)
8 Source: IEA, Andalusian Statistical Institute.
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(b) Furthermore, to avoid obtaining policies that could affect drastically the public budget,
we impose the condition that both the overall tax revenue and the overall public expen-
diture in goods and services must be equal to their values in the benchmark situation,
although the composition by sectors may change.9
4. RESULTS: AN EFFICIENT (SHORT-RUN) PHILLIPS CURVE
The equilibrium of our CGE model gives, as a result, the unemployment and inﬂation rates
as (implicit) functions of the policy variables, that is, u = u(x) and π = π(x) and, with
this information, the policy-making problem is fully described. In this section, we make the
assumption that the policy-maker is concerned about inﬂation and unemployment as the only
policy objectives. Moreover, we assume that the policy-maker acts rationally by choosing
the values of its policy instruments (in our case, the ﬁscal policy variables: taxes and public
expenditure) to optimize in some sense its policy objectives (in this case, unemployment
and inﬂation).
The ﬁrst question we want to answer is to what extent both policy objectives are compat-
ible or not. In other words, is it possible for the policy-makers to get simultaneously a good
result in unemployment and inﬂation? In practice, asking this question is almost the same
as determining if there exists a downward sloping Phillips curve or not.With our model, we
can asses the degree of conﬂict between both objectives by computing the so-called pay-off
matrix. This is done by solving two mono-criteria problems that consist of optimizing each
objective separately disregarding the other one. First, we ﬁnd the minimum feasible value
of unemployment. This is done by solving a well-deﬁned optimization problem where the
objective function is unemployment, the decision variables are taxes and public expen-
ditues and the feasible set is determined by two types of constraints: on the one hand, all the
equations of the CGE model (including accounting identities, behavioural equations and
equilibrium conditions) and, on the other hand, the upper and lower bounds on the decision
variables introduced in Section 2.3.10 This exercise renders the minimum attainable value of
unemployment, which is refereed to as ideal value of unemployment and denoted as u∗. As
a by-product of this exercise, we get an associated value of inﬂation (which is interpreted
as that value of inﬂation that one needs to accept in order to minimize unemployment).
Both of these values for unemployment and inﬂation comprise the ﬁrst row of the pay-off
matrix (Table 2). In the same way, we obtain the ideal (i.e. minimum attainable) value of
inﬂation, π∗ and an associated value of unemployment. The worst (maximum) value of
each column is called the anti-ideal (or nadir) value for the associated objective: u∗ and π∗,
which corresponds to the achievement of each objective, when the other one is optimized.
The ﬁrst row of Table 2 shows that it would be possible to obtain an unemploy-
ment rate u∗ = 33.1%, together with a high inﬂation rate π∗ = 3.6%. Similarly, (as the
result of an opposite policy) the second row shows another feasible combination with
essentially a zero inﬂation rate (actually, a slight deﬂation, π∗ = −0.1%) compatible
9 For the tax revenue, we impose the condition that it must be constant in current value terms. Nevertheless, for the
total public expenditure, we found more natural to impose that it must be constant in real terms, since the public
sectors is usually obliged to make some expenditures independently of their monetary costs.
10 In practical terms, this problem is solved using GAMS software and, more speciﬁcally, MINOS solver. For
more details about the algorithm, see GAMS documentation at http://www.gams.com/docs/minoslog.
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TABLE 2. Pay-off matrix unemployment vs. inﬂation.
u Unemployment (%) π Inﬂation (%)
Min u 33.1 3.6
Min π 34.5 −0.1
Source: Own elaboration.
with a higher unemployment rate u∗ = 34.5%. The values in the main diagonal (the
minimum-unemployment rate and the minimum inﬂation rate) give the ideal point and the
vector with the worst element of each column (in this case, the maximum unemployment
rate and the maximum inﬂation rate) gives the anti-ideal or nadir point.
Regarding the behaviour of the most relevant sectors (that were identiﬁed in Section
3.2), Construction (20) and Other services (23) grow under both policies although this
growth is bigger when minimizing unemployment (8.3% and 7%, respectively) than when
minimizing inﬂation (4.7% and 4.5%). The minimum-unemployment solution involves a
positive growth of all sectors except for Non-sales services (which decreases by 14.5%).
The most signiﬁcant growth rates correspond to the already mentioned sectors (20) and (23)
although Manufacturing of construction (10), Manufacturing of metals (12) and Machinery
(13) also register a remarkable growth around 6% in all three cases. On the other hand,
minimizing inﬂation entails a reduction in the activity of 18 out of 25 sectors and an
increment in just 6 of them, while Transports (15) remain broadly unchanged. As in the
minimum-unemployment policy, the largest growth corresponds to sectors 20 (4.7%), 23
(4.5%), 10 (3%), 12 (2.9%) and 13 (2.7%). Minery also experiences a more modest growth
of around 1.4%.
One ﬁrst conclusion we can draw from Table 2 is that there is a conﬂict between both
policy objectives, in the sense that it is not possible to get at the same time, the minimum
feasible unemployment and the minimum inﬂation rate. The reason is that minimizing
unemployment implies accepting a higher degree of inﬂation and the other way around.
This conﬂict is an essential element to have a genuine multicriteria (in this case, bicriteria)
problem. The second observation is that whereas inﬂation displays a rather wide range of
variation, the unemployment in Andalusia (at least in the period under analysis) seems to
show a low degree of sensitivity with respect to ﬁscal policy, since the range of variation
of u is very small. This result is coherent with other existing studies for Andalusia in the
literature (see, for example, Cardenete and Sancho, 2003) and it amounts to the notably high
values of unemployment displayed in the table. Recall that unemployment has traditionally
been a very hard problem in Spain (see, for example, Blanchard et al., 1995) and especially
in Andalusia. Table 3 presents some macroeonomic indicators regarding the Spanish and
Andalusian economy in 1995.
TABLE 3. Some macroeconomic indicators of Andalusia and Spain, 1995.
GDP current One-year growth Activity Unemployment PD 106 Inﬂation
106 euros rate (%) rate (%) rate (%) current euros rate (%)
Andalusia 58,384.3 2.79 48.91 33.9 11,080.1 4.4
Spain 447,205.0 2.76 51.01 22.8 29,068.5 4.7
Source: Spanish Institute of Statistics and Andalusian Institute of Statistics.
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FIGURE 1. Trade-off between unemployment and inﬂation.Source: Own elaboration.
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The second step is to evaluate the available options to trade-off inﬂation for unemploy-
ment. The idea is to test different combinations of the policy instruments and compute the
resulting values of inﬂation and unemployment. Nevertheless, since we have intentionally
allowed for a very large range of policy combinations, it is not possible (not useful) to test
all of them. Following the approach suggested in André and Cardenete (2009a; 2009b), we
focus on the set of so-called efﬁcient policies. Following the classical Pareto criterion, we
say that a policy combination x providing the objective values (u, π ) is efﬁcient if there
is not another feasible policy x′ providing (u′, π ′) such that, either u′ ≤ u and π ′ < π or
u′ < u and π ′ ≤ π .
We obtain (an approximation to) the efﬁcient set of policies using the multicriteria
technique known as multiobjetive programming, implemented by means of the so-called
constraint method. This procedure consists of optimizing one of the objectives, while the
other one is placed as a parametric constraint. In our case, we make a grid for the feasible
values of π , from π = −0.1 to π = 3.6. Let πn denote one speciﬁc value of π in the grid.
For each one of these values, we solve the problem min u subject to the constraint π ≤ πn
and all the equations in themodel (it is arbitrary which objective is parameterized andwhich
one is optimized in every point).
Figure 1 shows the results of these calculations. The resulting curve can be interpreted as
an approximation to the traditional short-run Phillips curve and its slope can be understood
as the policy trade-off between objectives, i.e. the increment in inﬂation that one must
accept in order to decrease unemployment or the other way around. Note that the slope is
negative but decreasing. The interpretation of this fact is that, when unemployment is “low”,
further unemployment reductions require larger increments in inﬂation. Alternatively, if
the inﬂation rate is low, reaching additional reductions would be more costly in terms of
increased unemployment. This seems reasonable from an economic point of view: if the
economy is at very good levels on one objective, it would be difﬁcult to realize additional
improvements on that same objective.
Three important remarks apply to this particular version of the Phillips curve: ﬁrst, it
is important to note that the curve shown in Figure 1 is not exogenously imposed but
endogenously obtained from the model as an equilibrium result. In our model, the labour
supply Equation 5 states a positive relationship between prices and unemployment for a
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given value of wages (what, by itself, would result in an increasing rather than decreasing
Phillips curve), but the goods-demand side of the model pulls in the opposite direction:
more economic activity entails both less unemployment and more demand, which, in turns,
pushes prices up (what tends to generate a decreasing relationship between unemployment
and inﬂation). Therefore, the ﬁnal observed trade-off between both variables is a result of all
the economic forces in equilibrium. The existence of a Phillips-like relationship between
inﬂation and unemployment (i.e. a decreasing curve) in Andalusia 1995 is an empirical
ﬁnding, not an assumption of the model. Moreover, it is an ex-post equilibrium relationship
between unemployment and inﬂation that takes into account all general equilibrium (direct
and indirect) effects of policies on unemployment and prices.
Second, the classical approach in the empirical literature is to look for a Phillips curve by
plotting together pair-wise observations of unemployment and inﬂation for different years
and perhaps adjusting some statistical regression (Phillips, 1958; Lipsey, 1960; Samuelson
and Solow, 1960). Given that the points in such plots correspond to different years, some
structural elements of the economy might change across those points. As a consequence,
those results might not be strictly interpreted as a policy trade-off, since moving from
one point to another across the curve would not be possible just by changing the economic
policy. The Phillips-like curve shown in Figure 1 is obtained for a given economy in the same
period of time. Therefore, the underlying fundamentals of the economy can be considered
as constant and the only thing that changes from one point of the curve to another is
the implemented combination of policy instruments. In this sense, this curve can be more
properly interpreted as a pure policy trade-off or, to follow the classical jargon, a (short-run)
“policy menu”.
Third, an important remark should be made regarding the interpretation of this result as
a Phillips-like curve: since the government can, in principle, implement a wide variety of
policy combinations, it is also possible that some of these policies result in unemployment–
inﬂation combinations strictly above (and to the right of) the curve in Figure 1, meaning that
the implemented policy is not efﬁcient since it would be Pareto-dominated by some points in
the curve. By construction, no observations could be found below the curve. From this point
of view, the curve obtained in Figure 1 can be labelled as an “efﬁcient Phillips curve” in the
sense that all the points in this curve result from efﬁcient (i.e. non-dominanted) policies.
The main political implications of these results for the region of Andalusia are, ﬁrst,
that by implementing different combinations of taxes and public expenditure in an efﬁcient
manner it is possible, to some extent, to trade-off between inﬂation and unemployment and,
second, as a result of changing these policy combinations, we can expect to get relatively
large variations in inﬂation even in the short-run, whereas the possibilities to reduce the rate
of unemployment in the short-run are very limited.
5. A BROADERAPPROACH: POLICIESWITH MULTIPLE CRITERIA
In this paper, we are adopting a very pragmatic approach of the short-run Phillips curve
in the sense that we are not dealing with doctrinal or philosophical issues but rather with
a purely policy-oriented motivation: to what extent the government can adjust its policy
options to trade-off between unemployment and inﬂation.
In this same pragmatic spirit, we can argue that, in practice, the government is normally
concerned, not only about inﬂation and unemployment, but also about other economic
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indicators such as economic growth, public deﬁcit (PD) and so on.Moreover, it is reasonable
to think that all these indicators are related with each other.As an immediate conclusion, we
can see the short-run Phillips curve (from the point of view of policy design) as a particular
case of a more general setting in which the government cares about many conﬂicting policy
objectives and has to design its policy in order to ﬁnd a compromise among all of them.
In order to illustrate this broader approach, consider now that the government is concerned
about ﬁve objectives. Apart from inﬂation and unemployment, we also include three other
additional objectives, the ﬁrst one of which is the maximization of economic growth, γ ,
calculated as
γ = GDP1995 − GDP1994
GDP1994
· 100, (8)
whereGDP1994 is theGDP ofAndalusia, 1994, which is exogenously given (source: Spanish
Statistical Institute, INE) andGDP1995 is the value of GDP in the equilibrium themodel after
any of the simulations. Since GDP1994 is given, maximizing growth is totally equivalent
to maximizing GDP1995, but we incorporated the former as a policy objective since it is a
more standard indicator in real policy-making. Second, we introduce as an additional policy
objective the minimization of PD which is, in practice, an important political concern in
many countries and regions.Third, since the policy-makers are supposed to aim at increasing
social welfare, we include as an objective themaximization of compensating variation (CV),
which is a conventional welfare measure in monetary terms (see, for example, Mas-Colell
et al., 1995).Wearbitrarily setCV = 0 in the benchmark situation, in such away thatCV > 0
(<0) means that, after implementing the analysed policy combination, the consumers are
better off (worse off) than before implementing it. PD andCV aremeasured inmillion euros.
Summing up, we consider two “more is better” objectives (which must be maximized):
growth and CV, and three “less is better” objectives (to be minimized): unemployment, PD
and inﬂation. One of the advantages ofMCDM is its ability to deal with objectivesmeasured
in different units. In this case, γ , π and u are measured in percentage terms, whereas PD
and CV are measured in million euros.
By solving ﬁvemono-criteria problems, we get the pay-offmatrix for this policy problem,
which is given in Table 4.As in the previous exercise, the values in the main diagonal, which
are displayed in bold characters, constitute the ideal point, whereas the worst value for each
column (displayed underlined) comprises the anti-ideal point. A visual inspection of the
matrix reveals the following conﬂicts among objectives: growth and unemployment have a
joint behaviour in the sense that there is no conﬂict between them, but both of them strongly
conﬂict with inﬂation and PD. PD, in turn, behaves almost exactly the same as inﬂation.
The reason for this is the particular way in which the policy exercises are designed: PD
TABLE 4. Pay-off matrix of the problem with ﬁve objectives.
γ (%) π (%) u (%) PD (106 euros) CV (106 euros)
Max γ 3.4 3.6 33.1 10,860.5 2,243.5
Min π 2.4 −0.1 34.5 10,058.6 −7,642.7
Min u 3.4 3.6 33.1 10,854.8 2,177.4
Min PD 2.3 −0.1 34.5 10,056.5 −7,903.9
Max CV 3.2 3.9 33.4 11,072.4 3,049.0
Source: Own elaboration.
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
THE POLICY TRADE-OFF BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION 15
is measured in nominal terms (current monetary units) so that its value can vary, on the
one hand, because of real shifts in public income or expenditure, and on the other hand,
because of changes in prices. As documented in the previous section (see endnote 8), the
policy exercises are constrained to give the same (nominal) value for public income,whereas
public expenditure is restricted to be constant in real terms.Given these constraints, reducing
(nominal) PD is consistent with reducing prices (while the nominal value of public income
is constrained to be ﬁxed). Finally, the CV seems to display a moderate degree of conﬂict
with growth and unemployment and a strong degree of conﬂict with inﬂation and PD.11
It is important to recall that all these ﬁve combinations can be seen as ﬁve alternative
policy mixes which, in turn, result in different sectoral implications. Nevertheless, when
we analyse the most signiﬁcant changes across simulations, it is interesting to note that
there are important similarities among all ﬁve. Actually, if we focus on the ﬁve sectors that
grow more in each case, we see that these ﬁve sectors are the same in the ﬁve simulations
although the order is not always the same. Two of those sectors (20 and 23) have been
classiﬁed as big sectors in Section 3.2 and the other three belong to manufacturing branches
– Machinery (13), Manufacturing of Construction (10) and Manufacturing of Metals (12).
When minimizing unemployment or maximizing GDP, we notice that the activity of these
ﬁve sectors grows well above the average sectoral growth, with positive increments ranging
from 6% to 8.60%. In the other three simulations, the increments displayed in the outlined
sectors are more moderate, but still clearly over the average. On the contrary, we also
ﬁnd another important common element of all ﬁve simulations’ behaviour in the fact that
Non-sales services (25) always decreases around 14%. This result can be interpreted as
a recommendation to reduce the dimension of the public sector in the region and this
conclusion seems to be very strongly supported by our results in the sense that it is extremely
robust to the policy objective that the policy-maker might choose to focus on.
We illustrate now two alternative ways to obtain efﬁcient policies: the previously used
constraint method and the weighting method. To apply the constraint method, we need to
optimize one single objectivewhile keeping the rest as parametric constraints. Theway to ﬁx
these constraints depends on the speciﬁc problem to be solved. To illustrate the technique,
we force all objectives except the one being optimized to have an equal or better value than
that in the observed situation. The observed values (Table 3) are the following:
g = 2.79%, p = 4.4%, u = 33.9%, PD = 11, 080.1, CV = 0, (9)
where PD and CV are measured in million euros. Thus, the ﬁrst candidate point is obtained
by solving the following problem:
Max γ
subject to π ≤ 4.4, u ≤ 33.9, PD ≤ 11, 080.1, CV ≥ 0.
all the equations of the model
(10)
The solution of problem (10) is given by
γ = 3.4, π = 3.6, u = 33.1, PD = 10, 860.5, CV = 2243.5.
11 Given the joint behaviour of some objectives, an operational way to deal this problem could be to group them
so that we end up with a problem with less than ﬁve objectives. Nevertheless, for illustrative purposes, we ﬁnd
useful to keep all ﬁve objectives in the analysis.
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TABLE 5. Using the constraint method with respect to the observed situation.
γ (%) π (%) u (%) PD (106 euros) CV (106 euros)
Max γ 3.4 3.6 33.1 10,860.5 2,243.5
Min π 3.2 1.7 33.4 10,542.7 0.0
Min u 3.4 3.6 33.1 10,854.8 2,177.4
Min PD 3.2 1.7 33.4 10,540.2 0.0
Max CV 3.2 3.9 33.4 11,072.4 3,049.0
Source: Own elaboration.
Note that this combination Pareto-dominates the observed situation, since not only the
growth rate is higher than the observed one, but also the CV is higher and inﬂation, unem-
ployment and PD are lower. So, we conclude that, according to our setting, the observed
policy displays some degree of inefﬁciency and it could be unambiguously improved with
respect to the ﬁve objectives considered here by changing the policy mix.
By doing similar calculations for each objective, we obtain ﬁve points which are dis-
played in the rows of Table 5. Note that some rows of this matrix are the same as those in
Table 4. Speciﬁcally, the solution when optimizing growth, unemployment and the CV are
the same as in the respective mono-criteria problems. The reason is simply that the con-
straints imposed are not binding since the unconstrained optima given in Table 4 dominate
the real observed values for all the objectives. Nevertheless, the situation is different for
inﬂation and PD, since the unconstrained optimal values (those in Table 4) violate the con-
straints for growth and unemployment. This makes the constrained optima being different
from the unconstrained ones. Anyway, note that all of the solutions presented in Table 5
dominate the observed situation in Andalusia 1995. One immediate conclusion is that the
policy that was implemented in practice could be seen as Pareto inefﬁcient (if we restrict the
ﬁve policy objectives considered here) or, in other words, that it could have been improved
(in Pareto sense) in several directions.
On the other hand, form a technical point of view, it is important to observe that, in the
solutions found in Table 5, some constraints are not binding. A sufﬁcient condition for the
constraint method to provide efﬁcient solutions is that all the parametric constraints are
binding. This means that we cannot be sure that the solutions found up to now are efﬁcient,
although any of them Pareto-dominates the observed situation.
At this point, in order to ﬁnd solutions that are efﬁcient for sure, we have at least two
possibilities: the ﬁrst one is to use still the constraint method and making the parametric
constraints tougher, by increasing the value of the “more is better objectives” (growth and
CV) and/or decreasing the value of the “less is better” objectives (inﬂation, unemployment
and PD) until we ﬁnd a solution when all of them are binding at the same time.
A second posible approach is to use the weighting method. This method consists of
maximizing the following sum of normalized value of objectives:
ωγ
γ − γ∗
γ ∗ − γ∗ + ωπ
π − π∗
π∗ − π∗ + ωu
u − u∗
u∗ − u∗ + ωDP
DP − DP∗
DP∗ − DP∗ + ωCV
CV − CV∗
CV∗ − CV∗ , (11)
where each objective is normalized by subtracting the anti-ideal value and dividing by the
difference between the ideal and the anti-ideal value (both of them being given in Table 4),
so that the resulting quotient is bounded by construction between 0 (when the objective is
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equal to the anti-ideal value) and 1 (when it is equal to the ideal value).12 This normalization
eliminates any units of measurement and allows the addition having mathematical and
economic sense. The coefﬁcients ωi are preference parameters representing how concerned
the policy-maker is about eachobjective i.We illustrate the policy combination obtainedwith
ωγ = ωπ = ωu = ωPD = ωCV = 1, meaning that the policy-maker is equally concerned
about all the objectives.Themaximization of (11)with this set ofweights gives the following
solution:
g = 3.4, p = 3.5, u = 33.1, PD = 10, 913.1, CV = 2643.1,
which Pareto-dominates the observed situation (10) and provides an alternative efﬁcient pol-
icy combination. By testing different combinations of weights, we obtain different efﬁcient
solutions which may respond to different preference conﬁgurations of the policy-maker.As
an extreme case, if we ﬁx ωi = 1 for a speciﬁc objective and ωj = 0 for the rest, meaning
that the policy-maker is concerned only about objective i, we would get the ith row of the
pay-off matrix.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper is not a doctrinal positioning on economic thought about the Phillips
curve, but a pragmatic reading which endeavours to be better suited for the sake of short-
run economic policy-making than traditional works on the Phillips curve. We do so by
combining two methodologies (CGE modelling and MCDM) to get a new, policy-oriented
reading of the short-run Phillips curve.
We conclude that the trade-off between unemployment and inﬂation (in the same fashion
as more general policy settings) can be seen as a multicriteria decision problem in which the
government can use its policy instruments to pursue different conﬂicting policy objectives.
Economic policy-making in general (and speciﬁcally the unemployment–inﬂation trade-
off) can be suitably represented as a multicriteria problem for a double reason. First, from a
conceptual perspective, it seems a sensibleway to understand and represent the concerns and
the procedures actually followed by policy-makers. Second, from an empirical perspective,
MCDMtechniques can be of considerable help to get operative policy advises and, therefore,
to decide how to use policy instruments in practice.
A CGE model calibrated for theAndalusian economy allows us to obtain a set of efﬁcient
policies that can be interpreted as a particular version of the classical (short-run) Phillips
curve, which we can label as optimal Phillips curve or efﬁcient Phillips curve. This curve
can provide a new reading of the short-run concept of the Phillips curve because it is built
as a real policy-based trade-off between inﬂation and unemployment at a speciﬁc moment
in time since the rest of fundamentals of the economy are ﬁxed. Moreover, it is a ex-post
curve in the sense that its existence and its shape are not a priori imposed as an assumption,
but is a result of all the equilibrium effects in the economy.
Regarding sectoral implications, our results help us to identify some sectors of the
Andalusian economy, namely Construction, Other Services, Machinery, Manufacturing
12 Note that, for the “more is better” (“less is better”) objectives, i.e. γ and CV (π , u and PD), the denominator is
positive (negative), so that the function depends positively (negatively) on the value of the objective.
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of Construction and Manufacturing of Metals, that seem to be particularly receptive to
changes in ﬁscal policy and, moreover, tend to grow very notably under any policy oriented
to maximize a relevant policy objective. On the other hand, our model very consistently rec-
ommends to decrease the weight of Non-sales services in Andalusia. This information can
be useful for regional policy-makers who, facing the current uncertain economic situation,
will have to prioritize their investment decisions for promoting growth under a scenario of
severe austerity.
This paper aims at providing a new operational approximation to the classical short-run
Phillips curve, getting some initial insights about what results can be obtained with real data
and how to use those results for policy-making. The analysis can be extended and improved
in a number of ways, such as constructing a dynamic and/or multiregional version of the
model and reﬁning the deﬁnition and selection of policy goals. This is left for future work,
since the fundamental contribution of the paper is not the applications itself, but rather
to suggest a methodological line of research combining different analytical instruments to
search for Pareto-optimal levels of inﬂation and unemployment rates in an speciﬁc economy.
The Phillips curve (when interpreted from the point of view of policy-making) can be
seen as a particular case of a broader approach for policy design. Enlarging the number of
objectives makes the problem computationally more demanding but also more interesting
and realistic. In the exercise, we have addressed the analysis of ﬁve policy objectives and we
have shown that the observed policy inAndalusia could have been unambiguously improved
(in Pareto sense) in a number of ways depending on the weights given by the policy-maker
to each objective. Another obvious line of future research is to perform a more detailed
analysis of the importance of each policy objective and the policy mixes that should be
implemented to optimize those objectives.
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